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ovel artiﬁ  cial genetic systems 
with twelve bases instead of 
four [1]. Bacteria that can 
be programmed to take photographs 
[2] or form visible patterns [3]. Cells 
that can count the number of times 
they divide [4]. A live polio virus 
“created from scratch using mail-
order segments of DNA and a viral 
genome map that is freely available 
on the Internet” [5]. These are some 
of the remarkable, and occasionally 
disturbing, fruits of “synthetic biology,” 
the attempt to construct life starting 
at the genetic level. In terms of their 
scale and ambition, these efforts 
go beyond traditional recombinant 
DNA technology. Rather than simply 
transferring a pre-existing gene from 
one species to another, synthetic 
biologists aim to make biology a true 
engineering discipline. 
In the same way that electrical 
engineers rely on standard 
capacitors and resistors, or computer 
programmers rely on modular blocks 
of code, synthetic biologists wish to 
create an array of modular biological 
parts that can be readily synthesized 
and mixed together in different 
combinations. The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) has a 
Registry of Standard Biological Parts 
that supports this goal by indexing 
biological parts that have been built, 
and offering assembly services to 
construct new parts, devices, and 
systems [6]. Systems, devices, parts, and 
DNA represent descending levels of 
complexity—systems consist of devices, 
and devices consist of parts composed 
of DNA. The idea behind a registry 
of parts is that these parts can, and 
should, be recombined in different 
ways to produce many different types 
of devices and systems. Although the 
registry currently contains physical 
DNA, its developers believe that, as 
DNA synthesis technology becomes 
increasingly inexpensive [7], the 
registry will be composed largely of 
information and speciﬁ  cations that 
can be executed in synthesizers just 
as semiconductor chip designs are 
executed by fabrication ﬁ  rms.
Synthetic biology has already 
produced important results, including 
more accurate AIDS tests and the 
possibility of unlimited supplies of 
previously scarce drugs for malaria 
[8]. Proponents hope to use synthetic 
organisms to produce not only 
medically relevant chemicals but also 
industrial materials, including biofuels 
such as hydrogen and ethanol [9]. At 
the same time, synthetic biology has 
engendered numerous policy concerns. 
From its inception, commentators have 
raised issues ranging from bioethical 
and environmental worries to fears of 
bioterrorism—indeed, the US Central 
Intelligence Agency released a report 
in 2003 called “The Darker Bioweapons 
Future” that explicitly referred to the 
dangers posed by the possibility of 
genetically engineered viruses [10]. 
There is, however, one area that 
has been largely unexplored until this 
point—the relationship of synthetic 
biology to intellectual property 
law. Two key issues deserve further 
attention. First, synthetic biology 
presents a particularly revealing 
example of a difﬁ  culty that the law 
has frequently faced over the last 
30 years—the assimilation of a new 
technology into the conceptual limits 
posed by existing intellectual property 
rights. There is reason to fear that 
tendencies in the way that US law has 
handled software on the one hand 
and biotechnology on the other could 
come together in a “perfect storm” 
that would impede the potential of 
the technology. Second, synthetic 
biology raises with remarkable clarity 
an issue that has seemed of only 
theoretical interest until now—the 
tension between different methods 
of creating “openness.” On the one 
hand, one standard mechanism for 
creating openness has involved putting 
material in the public domain, outside 
the world of property. On the other, 
synthetic biology researchers may want 
to use intellectual property rights to 
create a “commons,” just as developers 
of free and open source software use 
the leverage of software copyrights to 
impose requirements of openness on 
future programmers, requirements 
greater than those attaching to a public 
domain work. But synthetic biology, 
unlike software, is not necessarily 
protected by copyright. Should we 
rethink the boundary lines between 
intellectual property and the public 
domain as a result? 
The Perfect Storm: Flawed Biotech 
Law Meets Flawed Software Law?
Intellectual property law in the US has 
already had difﬁ  culty incorporating the 
revolutionary technologies from which 
synthetic biology draws inspiration—
biotechnology and computers. US 
patent law requires that inventions be 
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“nonobvious” to the ordinary scientist 
working in the area. Yet, in the area of 
biotechnology, years after methods for 
cloning genes have become routine and 
widely known, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit continues to treat 
the gene products of such methods as 
patentable [11]. By the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning, what matters is not whether 
a practicing biologist would ﬁ  nd a 
particular invention obvious, but rather 
per se rules about nonobviousness 
developed for chemical inventions in 
the mid-20th century [12]. 
While biotechnology has mainly 
posed difﬁ  culties for patent law, 
computers have posed both copyright 
and patent problems. Copyright covers 
original works of expression, explicitly 
excluding works that are functional. 
Patent law requires functionality; 
however, it had traditionally been 
understood to exclude formulas and 
algorithms. Thus, software—a machine 
made of words, a set of algorithmic 
instructions devoted to a particular 
function—seemed to ﬁ  t neither the 
copyright nor the patent box. It was 
too functional for copyright, too 
close to a collection of algorithms 
and ideas for patent. What’s more, 
certain economic aspects of software, 
including its high propensity to 
display “network effects” (increased 
utility based on increased numbers of 
users) led scholars to believe that both 
copyright and patent were ill-suited 
to encourage innovation without 
discouraging competition. Several sui 
generis, or custom-made, intellectual 
property regimes were proposed as an 
alternative. 
As a result of statements by the US 
Congress and actions by the courts, 
software ended up being covered by 
both copyright and patent in the US—a 
result that most scholars thought was 
far from ideal. Court refusals to allow 
patent examiners to use unwritten 
information to determine whether a 
particular patent application is obvious 
[13] may also have a disproportionate 
impact on computer-related inventions. 
Because much knowledge in the ﬁ  eld 
of computer technology is not written 
down in journal articles, it may be 
hard for a patent examiner to ﬁ  nd 
speciﬁ  c written references testifying to 
information that is generally known. 
Additionally, many scholars have 
argued that the Federal Circuit allows 
unduly broad patents to issue in the 
area of software [14].
The specter of broad patents has 
already reared its head in the ﬁ  eld 
of synthetic biology. Consider patent 
6,774,222, issued by the US Patent 
and Trademark Ofﬁ  ce on August 10, 
2004 [15]. The patent, issued to the 
US Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), is entitled “Molecular 
Computing Elements, Gates and Flip-
Flops.” This patent covers using the 
combination of nucleic-acid binding 
proteins and nucleic acids to set up 
data storage as well as logic gates that 
perform basic Boolean algebra. As the 
patent document notes, the invention 
could be used not only for computation 
but also for complex (“digital”) control 
of gene expression. The broadest claim 
does not limit itself to any particular 
set of nuclei-acid binding proteins or 
nucleic acids. Moreover, the claim uses 
language that would cover not only the 
“parts” that performed the Boolean 
algebra but also any device and system 
that contained these parts. Such a 
patent would seem effectively to patent 
the basic functions of computing when 
implemented by one likely genetic 
means. Would such a foundational 
patent hold up in court? 
Given the low nonobviousness 
threshold that the Federal Circuit has 
set in the area of biotechnology, there 
is some possibility that the court would 
apply a similarly low threshold here. 
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to 
allow unwritten knowledge to be used 
in determining nonobviousness may 
also impose a low threshold. Thus, even 
if, at the time the HHS invention was 
made, individuals working in the ﬁ  eld 
knew that many computing functions 
could readily be performed using DNA-
based “genetic switches,” this unwritten 
knowledge might not be factored into 
the nonobviousness determination. 
Notably, the HHS patent is not unique 
in its breadth [16,17].
Considerable historical evidence, 
including evidence from virtually 
every important industry of the 20th 
century, suggests that broad patents 
on foundational research can slow 
growth in the industry [18]. In the area 
of computer hardware, the specter 
of broad patents loomed large in the 
US until government action forced 
licensing of the AT&T transistor patent 
as well as patents obtained by Texas 
Instruments and Fairchild Instruments 
on integrated circuits. Fortunately, 
software was already a robust industry 
before broad software patents became 
available. Biotechnology’s foundational 
technologies—monoclonal antibodies 
and recombinant techniques—either 
were not patented or were made 
available widely at reasonable cost. 
Synthetic biology may be coming of 
age under different circumstances, at 
the juncture of two technologies with 
which the law is already struggling.
To be sure, to the extent that 
foundational patents are held by 
universities or government institutions, 
they may not be asserted aggressively 
so as to block research. However, in 
addition to the problem of broad 
foundational patents, there is the 
possibility of a plethora of narrower 
patents (some of which may fall within 
the scope of the foundational patents). 
For example, scientists at Boston 
University have ﬁ  led patents that claim 
the use of DNA to produce speciﬁ  c 
gene regulation mechanisms such as a 
multi-state oscillator [19–21]. MIT and 
the company Sangamo have patents on 
various types of DNA binding proteins. 
At least in the area of information 
technology, there is evidence that 
patent thickets [22] or “anti-commons” 
[23] create difﬁ  culties for subsequent 
researchers above and beyond those 
created by foundational patents. (The 
situation in biotechnology is less 
clear; compare [24] and [25].) This is 
because many products in information 
technology represent combinations of 
dozens, if not hundreds, of patented 
parts. Not only does a crowded patent 
landscape create the possibility of 
“hold up” by a previously unknown 
patent holder who emerges only after 
others have invested large sums of 
money in the area of the patented 
invention, but to the extent that 
patent rights holders rely upon reach-
through royalties to secure revenue, 
standard economic theory predicts that 
product output by the improver will 
be suboptimal. Moreover, while ﬁ  rms 
that work in information technology 
have sometimes succeeded in pooling 
patents, particularly patents around 
industry standards, such efforts have 
also been stymied by failure on the 
part of participating ﬁ  rms to disclose 
relevant patents [26]. In any event, 
because synthetic biology encompasses 
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not only information technology 
but also biotechnology, the absence 
of successful patent pools in the life 
sciences is cause for concern. 
A Synthetic Biology Commons?
These intellectual property concerns 
have not gone unnoticed. The MIT 
scientists involved with the Registry 
of Standard Biological Parts are 
sufﬁ  ciently concerned that they have 
created the BioBricks Foundation, 
which might serve to coordinate a 
synthetic biology “commons.” The 
idea of a synthetic biology commons 
draws inspiration, in part, from the 
prominence of the open source 
software model as an alternative 
to proprietary software. Unlike 
proprietary software developers, open 
source software producers make 
their source code freely available 
for improvement, modiﬁ  cation, and 
redistribution. Certain types of open 
source licenses also have a “commons-
expanding” aspect: these “copyleft” 
licenses not only make source code 
freely available, but they also require 
those who distribute improvements 
to the source code to make the 
improvements available on the same 
terms (see [27], which discusses GNU 
General Public License and other 
“copyleft” licenses). Copylefted software 
relies heavily on the existence of 
property rights—speciﬁ  cally, copyright 
in the source code. Because of this 
copyright, users of the copylefted 
software necessarily use it subject to the 
terms of the license. 
Synthetic biologists might argue that 
strings of DNA bases are comparable 
to source code and that DNA strings 
could therefore also be covered by 
copyright. However, software itself 
ﬁ  ts poorly into copyright’s categories. 
The US Congress indicated a desire 
that software be covered by copyright, 
but left it to the courts to work out 
the method of doing so. As developed 
by the courts, copyright protection in 
software is thin—for example, source 
code is generally protected against 
verbatim copying. But even with source 
code, if the code is entirely dictated 
by functional concerns or has become 
an industry standard, it may not be 
protected by copyright at all.
Where does this leave synthetic 
biology? There are two major 
obstacles to establishing copyright. 
First, unlike software, the products of 
synthetic biology are not discussed as 
copyrightable subject matter in the 
US copyright statute. Thus, a court 
that wished to ﬁ  nd that material 
copyrightable would have to do so 
by analogy. Second, even if courts 
were willing to make such an analogy, 
there are the internal restrictions of 
US copyright law, which does not 
cover functional articles or methods 
of operation, and requires expressive 
choices. As a matter of legal doctrine, 
the answer to whether an expressive 
choice had been made might depend 
upon the type of synthetic biology 
involved. For example, the construction 
of DNA sequences using base pairs 
that do not exist in nature might 
allow signiﬁ  cant room for expressive 
choice. Such DNA sequences might 
be protected by copyright, at least 
against verbatim copying. However, 
most synthetic biologists working today, 
including those at MIT, are working 
within the conﬁ  nes of the existing 
genetic code. This code constrains 
the expressive choices that they make, 
making copyright protection less likely. 
Thus, in the case of synthetic biology, 
the ability to invoke copyright is by no 
means clear. An obvious alternative 
is patents. One example of a patent-
based commons is that created by the 
group Biological Innovation for an 
Open Society (BIOS). BIOS is using 
patent protection on a few key plant 
gene transfer technologies to force 
licensees to put improvements to those 
technologies into the commons [28]. 
Although some have suggested that the 
BIOS approach could raise concerns 
about antitrust and patent misuse [29], 
the concern should be relatively small 
given BIOS’s mission to expand the 
commons and the relatively permissive, 
rule-of-reason-based approach taken 
by contemporary US antitrust law. The 
more pressing problem for projects like 
the MIT Registry of Standard Biological 
Parts—which contains more than 2,000 
standardized parts—is expense. A 
single patent can cost tens of thousands 
of dollars to secure. 
Of course, to the extent that a few 
broad patents—like the HHS patent 
noted above—might effectively cover 
many of the parts in the registry, the 
patent option becomes more plausible. 
In this scenario, the registry would 
essentially be exploiting ﬂ  aws in the 
current patent system for commons-
expanding purposes. The difﬁ  culty 
would be to identify an area of 
inventive territory that was quite broad 
but nonetheless not suggested either by 
prior broad patents or by information 
already in the public domain. 
Alternatively, the registry might try to 
attract statements of non-assertion by 
other patentees, on the model of recent 
statements by IBM, Sun Microsystems, 
and other ﬁ  rms, that they will not assert 
their patents against anyone working 
on open source software. Indeed, the 
fact that many synthetic biology patents 
are currently held by academic and 
government institutions may make such 
statements of assertion a real possibility. 
To the extent that institutions with 
synthetic biology patents vowed not to 
assert their patents against academic 
researchers, such a move would be a 
salutary development and a comfort 
to those working on the registry. Non-
assertion statements are not, however, 
a property right. In order to secure 
a property right, the owners of the 
MIT registry would need a license 
with explicit permission to sublicense. 
Moreover, patents licensed to the 
registry would have to cover, at least in 
some fashion, parts that were important 
for maintaining and expanding the 
commons. 
Another alternative for securing 
an expanding commons might rely 
on some kind of contract, such as a 
“clickwrap” license over the BioBricks 
Foundation data. This contractual 
alternative does not require an 
underlying property right. Instead, the 
contract simply imposes conditions 
as part of the price of access. One 
problem with such contracts is that 
they bind only those who receive the 
technology from the entity imposing 
the terms. Attempts to prevent leakage 
to those not bound by the terms of the 
contract can require strict restrictions 
on information dissemination. For 
example, for some time the publicly 
funded International HapMap 
Project (a database of human genetic 
variation) used a clickwrap license. 
This license required users of single 
nucleotide polymorphism data to 
refrain from combining it with their 
own proprietary single nucleotide 
polymorphism data in order to 
seek product patents on haplotypes 
(collections of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms). In order to prevent 
leakage of the data outside the conﬁ  nes 
of this clickwrap license, to those who 
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would then have no obligation to 
the HapMap commons, the license 
required those who sought the data to 
refrain from disseminating it to anyone 
who had not signed on to the license. 
Conventional publication of the data 
was not possible. This condition is no 
longer imposed because it is believed 
that the database has reached a 
sufﬁ  cient density to be self-sustaining 
and to defeat subsequent patent claims. 
But the old requirements indicate 
one of the difﬁ  culties of the clickwrap 
approach; the comparative weakness of 
the contractual restraints paradoxically 
requires extremely broad restrictions 
on dissemination. 
Finally, legislative proposals might 
create sui generis property rights 
mechanisms for protecting BioBricks 
Foundation data. Indeed, the European 
Union currently has sui generis 
protection of data. The evidence 
suggests, however, that strong property 
rights protection is likely to hinder 
rather than promote innovation [30]. 
A recent draft of the proposed “Treaty 
on Access to Knowledge” offers an 
alternative sui generis approach: under 
this approach, member countries would 
adopt legislation protecting “qualifying 
open databases” from patents on 
certain types of improvements for 
a speciﬁ  ed period of time (Article 
5-6 of [31]). Various commentators 
afﬁ  liated with the Access to Knowledge 
proposal have also suggested the 
possibility of “social patents” legislation: 
under this approach, a type of patent 
right could be secured at low or no 
cost, but it could not be used for 
exclusionary commercial purposes. 
Although these sui generis alternatives 
are quite intriguing, and certainly an 
improvement over ordinary property 
rights in databases, securing new 
legislation is a difﬁ  cult, uncertain, 
and slow route. Table 1 summarizes 
the advantages and disadvantages of 
a sui generis strategy as well as other 
strategies.
We close with one overarching 
observation. Copyleft licenses, which 
lead to the formation of an ever-
expanding commons, have worked 
well—even brilliantly—in the software 
context. These licenses have produced 
well-functioning code, and they have 
also constrained the threat posed by 
copyright and patent, particularly 
when such intellectual property could 
be attached to an incipient industry 
standard. Would they work as well in 
synthetic biology? There is reason for 
some caution. Intellectual property 
rights are relatively unimportant as 
incentives at any stage in the production 
of copyleft software. They are important 
mainly for the leverage they give to 
the licensor. But synthetic biology 
might be different. Though the uses 
of synthetic biology are by no means 
limited to biomedicine, at the end of 
some biological chains of innovation 
will lie the expensive development and 
commercialization of a drug. While 
taking a drug all the way through 
clinical trials mandated by the US Food 
and Drug Administration may not cost 
as much as drug companies claim, 
it does cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Whether patent rights are the 
best incentive mechanism for purposes 
of eliciting pharmaceutical R&D is not 
a question we can address here. Sufﬁ  ce 
it to say that our current system of 
ﬁ  nancing pharmaceutical innovation 
relies heavily on these rights. There 
is no direct equivalent in the world of 
free software. If a copyleft condition—
however drafted and imposed—did 
attach to some of synthetic biology’s 
parts, care would have to be taken in the 
design of the system, lest the result be to 
make it impossible for that technology 
to be developed into a patented therapy. 
The BIOS licenses, which restrict the 
copyleft condition to improvements 
on the enabling technology and do 
not constrain patenting on transgenic 
plant products, provide an interesting 
model. But the distinction between 
enabling technology and product may 
be easier to make in a situation like 
that faced by BIOS, where the enabling 
technology in question has a relatively 
clear innovation trajectory, both in 
terms of improvement to the technology 
itself and in terms of production of end 
products. 
In the meantime, the decision, 
already implemented, of the MIT 
Registry of Standard Biological Parts 
to place its parts into the public 
domain certainly provides important 
protection against the threat of patents 
clogging innovation in the synthetic 
biology space. Placing parts into the 
public domain not only makes the 
parts unpatentable, but it undermines 
the possibility of patents on trivial 
improvements. In the end, a public 
domain strategy comparable to that 
employed by the public Human 
Genome Project may not be ideal, but 
it is certainly a good start.  
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